In recent years, the causes and consequences of smuggling have attracted much attention in the media, mainly thanks to academics and policy makers. While a large body of literature is devoted to theoretical aspects of smuggling, only few empirical studies deal with this complex phenomenon. This paper presents estimates from a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes model in order to show, for the first time, the extent of smuggling for 55 countries around the world during the 1990s. Treating smuggling as a latent variable which is directly related to its underlying causes and indicators, an ordinal index of smuggling is derived. Additionally, a ranking of countries is provided. JEL-Classification: C31; O17; O57; H10; H 26; H71; K49
Introduction
Smuggling is a fact in societies all over the world. In essence it is an activity that is used to earn income from carrying goods across state borders in violation of existing rules. Smugglers generate income by avoiding state controls, regulations and related costs. Illegal trade accounts for a huge share of foreign trade in many developing economies (Pitt, 1981) . The main channel of illegal trade is abnormal pricing of imports and exports. Gathering accurate statistics about smuggling is not only important for scientists but also for government authorities and international financial agencies. First, misinvoicing and abnormal pricing in international transactions may arise from a high tax and tariff burden, custom duties, fraud, capital flight, high premium in the black foreign exchange market, money laundering 3 and even financing terrorism. Secondly, the detection of misinvoicing in trade and the smuggling of products are critical issues, because capital flights following the over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports erode a country's tax base and increase public deficit. The process of extracting these illegal revenues and transferring them abroad or laundering them in the domestic market often involves bribery of public agents and other forms of corruption.
They are part of the criminal spectrum of the underground economy that negatively impacts our societies. All of those critical issues justify a deeper investigation into illegal trade and smuggling around the world.
While a large body of literature is devoted to theoretical aspects of the effects of smuggling on social welfare 4 , there are just few empirical studies. These studies usually use only one proxy in order to measure the size of smuggling. 5 Recognizing that this by no means illustrates the comprehensive picture of such a complex phenomenon as smuggling, it is clear that the provision of a meaningful and comparable estimate of smuggling across countries requires an alternative approach. Using a Structural Equation Model (SEM) with a latent 3 One channel of laundering money is through mispricing of foreign trade transactions. Common in nearly every aspect of international business, false pricing has moved trillions of dollars illegally between countries. The value of an export shipment is understated on the invoice and other documents. The recorded amount is paid to the exporting country, and the remainder is deposited in an account in the importing country which the exporter owns. Overinvoicing of imports serves the same purpose. 4 See for example, Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) , Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973) , Martin and Panagariya (1984) , Norton (1988) , and Thursby et al. (1991) . 5 See for example Oskoee and Goswami (2003) . The dependent variable in their panel data study is tariff burden which is assumed to measure the level of smuggling. In our opinion, the reliability and robustness of this proxy could be hardly justified, because tariff burden is just an incentive for illegal trade. The methodology presented in this paper enables us to use several indicators and therefore reduces the risk of relying on just one broad proxy for smuggling.
3/24 variable, this paper takes the manifold causal and indicator variables of smuggling simultaneously into account. Our goals in this study are to identify the main causes and indicators of smuggling and derive an objective ordinal index of smuggling.
The next section reviews theoretical and empirical considerations regarding smuggling and how this activity is reflected in observable variables. The remainder of the paper introduces the methodology in Section 3. Section 4 illustrates the hypothesized path diagram and presents the results. Section 5 concludes. Phylaktis (1992) demonstrates the positive effects of this variable on individuals' incentives for smuggling in
Some Theoretical and Empirical Considerations
Chile. Oskoee and Goswami (2003) also use the tariff rate as a proxy of smuggling in their panel data study for 70 developing countries. Furthermore, these trade restrictions cause price disparity among domestic and international markets and those mark-ups on imported goods provide an incentive for illegal imports and tariff evasion (Pitt, 1981) . Whenever a country imposes such restrictions domestic prices differ from the world market price which may provide an incentive for smuggling.
To take liberalization of foreign trade in a particular country into account we employ a restriction index. This index is part of the Index of Globalization of the KOF Swiss Economic
Institute (Dreher, 2006) and ranges from 0 to 100. The higher the value of this index, the better the situation for free trade in a country. Thus, we henceforth refer to this index as a lack of trade restrictions index. Therefore, we expect a negative effect on smuggling, i.e. by liberalizing foreign trade and increasing openness in international trade through eliminating non-tariff barriers and similar red tape, the level of smuggling should fall. Openness is 4/24 measured by the Openness Index of the Penn World Table. Moreover, we use the measure of the average tariff burden from Wacziarg and Horn Welch (2003) as an alternative to keep a check on our results. Here, we expect a positive relationship between tariff burden and smuggling because higher values of this index indicate a higher tariff burden.
Unemployment
On the one hand, the reduction of unemployment due to economic growth may strengthen purchasing power of individuals and their effective demand for both legal and illegal products. Thus, the income effect of decreasing unemployment may contribute to a larger amount of illegal trade (Bajada, 2005) . On the other hand, and by means of the substitution effects of improved earnings, risk-averse individuals will reduce their exposure to risk and therefore demand more goods in the official and less in the unofficial economy. Thus, the size of illegal trade may fall.
With increasing unemployment the opposite effects hold true. That is, by the substitution effect, unemployed individuals will look for opportunities within the informal economy, including smuggling but due to their loss of income, a declining demand in the unofficial economy may result. Thus, the income effect will lead to less smuggling, ceteris paribus. All in all, the final outcome depends on the relative magnitude of the income and substitution effect.
Corruption and Rule of Law
Smuggling is directly linked to other types of crime, such as tax and import duties evasion, bribery and corruption of public officials, and money laundering. The probability of being caught and punished by law enforcing authorities depends, to some extent, on a country's rule of law. Sound institutions are a limiting factor that makes smuggling less profitable because smugglers try to maximize their net gain from smuggling, i.e. the difference of their expected revenues and expected costs, including penalties on their illegal trade. The higher the expected costs and the lower the expected net gain, the less profitable smuggling is. However, this specific kind of information about penalty rates is not available on a broad basis as is required for a cross-country analysis. The most relevant alternative is using the index of rule of law from World Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann et al., 2007) as a proxy. The range of this index is from -2.5 to 2.5 while higher values indicate a stronger police and 5/24 judiciary system. Therefore, we expect this index to have a negative effect on the size of smuggling in an economy.
We apply the corruption index from the Index of Economic Freedom of the Heritage Foundation (Holmes et al., 2007) to examine the relationship between smuggling and corruption in an economy. Alternatively, and as a robustness check, the measure of corruption from WGI (Kaufmann et al., 2007) is used. Both indices are defined in a way that higher values of the index indicate a lower level of corruption. Therefore we henceforth refer to each of them as a lack of corruption index and expect a negative relationship between smuggling and the respective lack of corruption index.
Indicators of smuggling

Black Market Premium
One of the main outcomes of strict controls of the foreign exchange market and limitations on free trade is an increasing gap between the official and parallel exchange rate. This gap is a very attractive incentive for traders to under-invoice their exports. The unrecorded revenues are then supplied through the black market of exchange, realizing additional profits.
Additionally, importers compare the tariff rates and the premium in the black foreign exchange market and if the latter outweighs the former, they will over-invoice their actual imports. This enables the importer to acquire excess foreign exchange in the official market and sell it in the black market with a premium. The link between tariffs and the Black Market Premium (BMP) has been extensively analysed in Biswas and Marjit (2002) and Marjit et al. (2000) . Moreover, Oskoee and Goswami (2003) have examined the positive effects of import smuggling (using the tariff rate as proxy) on the BMP. We expect that increasing underinvoicing of imports and exports raises the BMP.
Tax Revenues
Tax revenues, notwithstanding those from natural resource rich economies, shape the predominant source of government revenues in most countries. The different sources of total tax revenues obtained by government and their relative contribution depend to a large extent on the tax policy and the structure of an economy. For example, while high income countries pay more attention to direct taxes (e.g. tax on income and profits), low income countries focus on indirect taxes, including taxes on international trade (Askari, 2006) . Of course, free trade 6/24
and elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers have also intensified this reliance on direct taxes, especially among developed economies. This is because administrative and implementation costs of imposing taxes are lower for indirect taxes like taxes on international trade than for direct ones. Therefore developing countries rely more on these kinds of taxes compared to their developed counterparts. All together, weak global integration of low income countries, more dependence on indirect taxes and low enforcement of law create ample incentives for illegal activities in foreign trade. Smugglers, by evading legal duties and tariffs, are an extra burden for a government's budget. Naturally, their activities reduce the government's ability (especially in developing countries) to provide public goods and may worsen the budget deficit. Therefore, we expect that an increasing amount of smuggling leads to a fall in foreign trade tax revenues of central government, ceteris paribus. In this study, we examine the effect of smuggling on total tax revenues of government, taking into account a substantial amount of missing data on foreign trade taxes. The source of total tax revenues is WDI (2006).
GDP per capita
The GDP per capita is basically used as control variable. Arguably, those societies that are more open and liberalized and therefore exhibit a lower level of smuggling tend to have a higher GDP per capita. Furthermore, smugglers evade legal taxes and social contributions and waste scarce resources in unproductive activities like corruption and money laundering. This may have harmful consequences for the governments' ability to provide public goods. As shown by others (e.g. Johnson et al., 1997 and Loayza, 1996) , the provision of public goods by the government increases productivity of firms in the official economy. 7 Therefore illegal activities in the shadow economy like smuggling negatively impact economic growth.
Consequently we expect a negative relationship between smuggling and GDP per capita.
The definitions of all variables and their sources are summarized in Table A .1 in the Appendix. In the next section we describe the SEM and its application to the measurement of smuggling.
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Methodology
The beauty of a SEM is that it examines relationships among one or more latent variables that represent themselves by means of different manifest variables. Thereby the basic necessity is that the latent variables are nearly perfectly represented by the observed variable(s) in the model. In this paper we investigate a particular alternative of a SEM with only one latent endogenous variable η , which is smuggling. This type of a SEM is known as a multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) model. It explains the relationship between observable variables and the unobservable variable by minimizing the distance between the sample covariance matrix S and the covariance matrix ) (θ Σ predicted by the model. The observable variables are divided into causes of the latent variable and its indicators. Therefore, the main benefit of this approach is that it considers the multiple causes as well as the multiple effects of smuggling in an economy. The MIMIC model approach in economics can be traced back to Weck (1983) , Frey and Weck (1983) and Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) , and was enhanced by Aigner et al. (1988) and is now usually employed in studies on the shadow economy. 
where
is a ) q 1 ( × vector of coefficients in the structural model describing the "causal" relationships between the latent variable and its causes. Thus, the latent variable η is linearly determined by a set of exogenous causes. Since they only partially explain the latent variable η, the error term ς represents the unexplained component. The MIMIC model assumes that the variables are measured as deviations from their mean and that the error term does not correlate to the causes, i.e.
. The variance of ς is abbreviated by ψ and Φ is the )( × covariance matrix of the causes x .
The measurement model represents the link between the latent variable and its indicators; i.e. the latent unobservable variable is expressed in terms of observable variables.
It is specified by: 
. Figure 3 .1 shows the structure of the MIMIC model. 
being similarly constrained like Π . Therefore the estimation of the model requires the normalization of one of the elements of the vector λ to an a priori value. Furthermore from equation (1) and (2) 
where ) (θ Σ is a function of the parameters λ , γ and the covariances contained in Φ , ε Θ , and ψ . Since the latent variable is not observable, its size is unknown, and the parameters of the model must be estimated using the links between the observed variables' variances and covariances. Thus, the goal of the estimation procedure is to find values for the parameters and covariances that produce an estimate for
, that is as close as possible to the sample covariance matrix S for the observed causes and indicators, i.e. the x s and y s.
The estimation procedure deriving the parameters minimizes the following fitting function:
The first step in the MIMIC model estimation is to confirm the hypothesized "causal" 
Results
According to the theoretical considerations in section 2, we employ the following causes in our MIMIC approach to smuggling: tariff burden/trade restrictions, trade openness, corruption, unemployment rate, and rule of law. Therefore, the precise specification of the structural equation (1) 
On the side of the measurement model and as indicators of smuggling we use BMP, tax revenues, and GDP per capita. Thus, equation (2) We estimated the MIMIC model over the period of 1991-1999 for 55 cross-section observations and took the average value of the available data over the mentioned period. The time period was limited to the cut-off of 1999 because of the unavailability of information on 11/24 some key variables such as the BMP beyond this period. On the side of the causes, the lack of corruption index shows a consistent and negative effect on the latent variable of smuggling. This effect is in all specifications, except specification 3, statistically significant at convenient significance levels. To keep a robustness check on our results, we used two different corruption indices, the first from the Heritage Foundation (Holmes et al., 2007) and the second from WGI (Kaufmann et al., 2007) . Bearing in mind from section 2 that for both indices lower index values imply a higher level of corruption and vice versa, our results are as expected. The dominant and strongly significant impact of the rule of law index is illustrated in all chosen specifications. This index, which can be seen as a proxy for a penalty rate on smuggling, measures the agents' confidence in, and tendency to abide by, the rules of the society. It is also an indicator for the quality of the police, the courts and the likelihood of crime and violence in a society. The lack of trade restrictions index 12/24 comprises hidden barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade (per cent of current revenues), and capital account restrictions. Its effect on smuggling is also strongly significant.
It should be remembered that this index ranges from zero to 100, while a higher value of this index indicates a smaller degree of restriction on trade. Thus, the observed negative relationship between the trade restriction index and smuggling means that fewer trade restrictions will, as expected, lower the level of smuggling. Here, we separately controlled for the effect of average tariffs on imports as an additional robustness check. As shown in specifications 4 and 5, higher levels of tariff burden lead to higher levels of smuggling. This effect is significant at the 1% level. Because of the high correlation between these two indices 9 , this confirms our findings regarding the lack of trade restriction index. In our most general specification we have also included the unemployment rate in order to test for the Bajada (2005) hypothesis. He examined the relationship between unemployment and the shadow economy in Australia. According to Bajada (2005) , this relationship depends on the magnitude of the income effect and substitution effect, respectively. Depending on which effect dominates, a negative or positive relationship occurs. We find a negative relationship between these variables, considering smuggling as an integral part of the illegal spectrum of the shadow economy. This might be an indicator for a stronger income effect. However, this effect is not statistically significant. All in all, the magnitude of the estimates is fairly robust over all different specifications.
Turning to the indicators, we see that they are fairly consistent among different specifications. As explained in section 3, one of the coefficients of the indicators has to be normalized. In this study we selected GDP per capita while a negative relationship between this variable and smuggling is expected to hold. We then fixed the coefficient of GDP per capita to -1. However, as indicated by Stapleton (1978) , the choice of the indicator fixing the scale of the latent variable is to some extent arbitrary but does not affect the results. The effect of smuggling on BMP is positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance level, thus supporting the theoretical predictions of Biswas and Marjit (2002) . According to our theoretical considerations, governments' tax revenues as a third indicator are negatively affected by smuggling. This effect is strongly significant in all specifications. The mechanism of this negative effect is through foreign trade taxes. Smugglers, by evading legal taxes and duties, reduce governments' revenues on international trade which finally results in a reduction in overall tax revenues. 9 The correlation between the index of trade restrictions and the index of tariff burden is about 70%.
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To find out about the relative importance of each cause and indicator in a particular specification, an examination of the estimated standardized coefficients is necessary. Table 4 .1 also presents further goodness of fit indices, including the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), and the Normal Fit Index (NFI).
These indices range from zero to one, i.e. values close to one indicate a better fit. They altogether provide more information for the selection of the appropriate specification. Based on the goodness of fit indices we conclude that especially models 2 and 5 fit the data rather well. Together with the standardized data for the country-specific causes we use the estimated normalized parameters of both acceptable model specifications to derive the latent scores for the 55 countries in our sample. 12 The results are presented in Table 4 .2. The higher the amount of the smuggling index the higher is the level of smuggling over the period of 1991-1999 in a particular country and vice versa. The ranking of countries corresponds to specification 2 while the third column gives the county's ranking according to specification 5.
A comparison between both specifications shows that the results are robust. Nevertheless, from Table 4 .2 it can also be seen that minor differences between both specifications exist.
For example, Sweden exhibits the 3 rd lowest level of smuggling according to specification 2 but ranks 4 th according to specification 5. 14/24 Table D .1 in Appendix D). As argued earlier, smuggling often involves other types of criminal and corrupt activities. Thus, Figure 2 illustrates the strong co-movement of our index of smuggling with the corruption perception index (henceforth, CPI99) of Transparency International (1999). As higher levels of the CPI99 represent a lower level of corruption in a particular country, we used its reverse to illustrate the co-movement between both indices. The reverse of CPI99 on the right axis therefore ranges from 0 to 9 while our index of smuggling on the left axis ranges from -2.5 to 1.5.
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Conclusion
This paper, estimating an objective index of smuggling for 55 developed and developing countries, provides the first consistent estimate of the size of smuggling around the world during the 1990s. This is the first attempt to clarify smuggling and provide a deeper insight for policy makers. Using a MIMIC model we simultaneously employed causes and indicators of smuggling in our cross-country framework. This approach has some important advantages.
First, in contrast to existing studies which use very limited concepts as a proxy of smuggling in their empirical analysis, the structural equation approach enables us to utilize the most relevant factors to explain smuggling within countries. Secondly, the ranking of countries based on the chosen causal variables is objective in nature. Therefore, this approach considers the common criticisms aimed at perception based indices such as difficulties with year-to-year comparisons because of changes in sample, methodology, and composition of underlying sources. In fact, our index of smuggling can be estimated over different sub-periods to evaluate the fluctuations of smuggling over time.
We found a highly statistically significant influence of the rule of law and of the level of corruption on smuggling. Moreover, trade restrictions and tariff burdens also contribute significantly to the size of smuggling. In general, the estimated MIMIC models show satisfactory statistical properties. According to our calculations Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Finland, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Austria are among the countries with the lowest level of smuggling. On the other hand, Paraguay, Guatemala, Pakistan, Algeria, Kenya, and Cameroon have the highest level.
Clearly, the MIMIC model presented in this paper is only a small step forward enhancing our insight into smuggling and illegal trade. Above all, policy makers may wish to assess the interactions between rule of law, institutional quality, corruption, and smuggling.
Modelling some of these variables as latent endogenous allows a closer examination of the relationships between these variables. This may provide a more accurate evaluation of the relative importance of each of them. However, this seems to be a fruitful area for future research. 2) WGI, World Bank, (Kaufmann et al., 2007) Rule of Law Measure for the extent of agents' confidence in and abidance by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence WGI, World Bank, (Kaufmann et al., 2007) Real GDP per capita
Real GDP over total population Penn World Table 6 .1 BMP Difference between the parallel exchange rate and the official exchange rate divided by the official exchange rate Easterly and Sewadeh (2000) Tax Revenues WDI (CD, 2006) 21/24 
